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Not only is the Internet the "most participatory form 
of mass speech yet developed,"l cyberspace also intro-
duces forms of communication and speech intermediaries 
with no precise real space corollaries.2 In particular, 
Internet service providers (ISPs), the primary entities 
responsible for providing individuals with access to 
cyberspace, do not fit neatly into the existing conceptual 
boxes for speech intermediaries under First Amendment 
law. Like traditional publishers, ISPs create and dis-
seminate content. But they also provide other services, 
including Internet access and e-mail and data transmis-
sion, similar to those provided by telephone companies 
and the postal service. All of these different functions 
internet 
publishers, and broadcasters. 6 
I have argued elsewhere that proponents of open 
access are trapped in a First Amendment catch-22.7 
Either the ISPs seeking access to cable systems and the 
cable ISPs opposing them are both speakers under the 
First Amendment and the rights of cable ISPs prevail,B 
or neither side may claim First Amendment protection 
because providing Internet access is not an expressive 
activity.9 The latter conclusion depends upon the exis-
tence of First Amendment principles that would permit 
the conceptual severance of the various services and 
functions provided by ISPs into expressive and non-




because of the 
physical differ-
appear as part of an integrated seamless package. 
Moreover, unlike traditional media, ISPs are capable of 
exercising absolute control over the information that 
appears on their networks and who may access that 
information. 
The control ISPs are capable of exercising over who 
may access their networks and the content that may be 
accessed clearly raises constitutional concerns with 
respect to efforts to regulate the "most participatory form 
of mass speech." How the First Amendment and the 
principles of freedom of speech that it represents will be 
applied to the Internet has been the subject of much 
debate. 3 While the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union4 resolved the general 
question of whether the First Amendment would apply to 
the Internet at all, the current controversy over open 
access to cable Internet networks raises a more funda-
mental question. 5 Given the variety of different func-
tions and services provided by ISPs, how do we deter-
mine when ISPs should be considered speakers entitled 
to protection under the First Amendment? The answer to 
this question is critical as traditional media prepare 
themselves for cyberspace, and as Congress and local 
governments attempt to regulate these speech interme-
diaries. To answer it, we must address the latent ambi-
guities in First Amendment jurisprudence brought about 
by the Supreme Court's divergent treatment of existing 
mediums for communication, including common carriers, 
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ences and separa-
tion between media. Publishing, broadcasting, and 
telecommunications were provided by different entities 
and separated by different modes of communication. 
Each mode of communication had its own unique charac-
teristics and limitations. Given the convergence of these 
forms in the new medium of the Internet, it remains to be 
seen whether constitutional principles exist that would 
permit the conceptual severance of corresponding activi-
ties when they occur in chorus on the Internet. 
In an effort to determine whether coherent constitu-
tional principles exist that would allow the treatment of 
ISPs as speakers under some circumstances but not oth-
ers, this Article examines congressional treatment of 
ISPs under the Communications Decency Act (CDA)lO 
and the Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act (OCILLA).ll Because these statutes 
address the circumstances in which ISPs should be sub-
ject to liability for injuries traditionally related to expres-
sion, defamation, and copyright infringement, they 
implicitly provide us with insight into the circumstances 
in which Congress considers ISPs speakers. While the 
statutes do not directly address what acts of ISPs should 
be considered expressive activity protected by the First 
Amendment, we may draw certain inferences from their 
treatment of ISPs and the assumptions underlying both 
statutes. 
This Article argues that under the CDA and OCILLA, 
Congress adopted facially inconsistent approaches 
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towards ISP liability for expressiOn. Nonetheless, 
despite the overt differences, it is possible to discern an 
underlying principle for determining when ISPs should 
be considered speakers that reconciles this inconsistency. 
Put simply, the CDA and OCILLA support an approach 
toward determining when ISPs are speakers that focuses 
on whether an ISP exercises editorial control over its net-
work. This approach is evidenced by the fact that both 
statutes recognize that ISPs 
are able to exercise editorial 
control over any and all con-
tent on their networks, and 
both encourage the exercise 
of that control in one form 
or another. 
Part I summarizes the 
open access controversy and 
explains why the search for 
-~ ..... 
a principled means of ana-
lyzing the free speech 
claims. of ISPs is necessary. 
Parts II & III examine the 
CDA and OCILLA and their respective treatments of 
ISPs in light of First Amendment concerns. Lastly, part 
IV argues that the congressional treatment of ISPs under 
those statutes are facially at odds with one another and 
cannot be reconciled by coherent legal principles. Part IV 
concludes, however, that despite the obvious differences 
between the CDA and OCILLA, it is possible to discern 
an underlying principle based on editorial control for rec-
ognizing when, according to Congress, ISPs can and 
should be treated as speakers. 
I. Open Internet Access & Free Speech 
A The Open Access Controversy 
One of the current battles in the war for Internet dom-
inance is being fought over the right to control the mar-
ket for residential broadband access. Broadband refers 
to the ability to deliver information at speeds in excess of 
200 kilobits per second (Kbps).l2 In general, Internet 
users access their e-mail or surf the web by connecting 
with ISPs such as AOL, Prodigy, or Netzero through the 
copper twisted wire of the local telephone company.l3 
Due to technical limitations, the speed at which informa-
tion is transmitted through these wires limits the rate at 
which data can be transferred to a maximum speed of 
fifty-six Kbps_l4 This means that downloading large files 
can take hours rather than seconds, changing webpages 
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may be painfully slow, and receiving full-motion video is 
virtually impossible.l5 In contrast, other technologies, 
including cable and digital subscriber lines (DSL), are 
capable of transmitting data up to one hundred times 
faster than traditional telephone lines. 16 At that speed, 
users can change webpages as quickly as they change 
channels on a television, and receiving streaming music 
and full-motion video becomes painless.17 
The functional differences 
between these technologies 
are the heart of the open 
access controversy. While 
just about all ISPs use 
broadband connections 
within their networks and 
to connect to other net-
works, most depend upon 
copper twisted telepnone 
lines to provide the actual 
link between the residential 
user and the ISP.l8 Since 
the Internet is only as fast as 
its slowest link, the connection from the home to the 
curb-commonly referred to as the "last mile"-generally 
dictates the rate at which information is sent and 
received by the residential user. Traditionally this "last 
mile" has been the most bandwidth-constrained portion 
of the Internet.19 However, this is beginning to change 
as cable companies upgrade their networks to accommo-
date the two-way transmission of information, and tele-
phone companies upgrade their networks to provide DSL 
service.20 
While the upgrading of cable networks continues to be 
universally applauded as a necessary improvement of 
our communications infrastructure, these changes are 
also perceived as threats to the economic survival of 
existing non-cable ISPs.21 In particular, such ISPs are 
concerned because after investing billions of dollars to 
upgrade their networks, cable companies have begun to 
compete with traditional ISPs, providing Internet servic-
es themselves or (more commonly) through an exclusive 
ISP partner. 22 Given the tremendous bandwidth and 
resulting functional differences between cable and regu-
lar telephone lines, AOL and other traditional ISPs wor-
ried that they would not be able to compete with cable 
ISPs in this billion-dollar industry.23 As a result, AOL 
and others have lobbied government officials at the local, 
state, and federal levels to force cable companies to open 
their networks so that all ISPs can compete to provide 
customers with Internet services over . the local cable 
company's high-speed network.24 The technological and 
resulting competitive advantages of cable over regular 
telephone lines also prompted AOL to purchase Time 
Warner, thereby acquiring high-speed cable networks of 
its own.25 
In response, cable ISPs argue that open access 
requirements are preempted by federal law and would 
otherwise violate their freedom of speech.26 According to 
the cable ISPs, by forcing them to carry competing ISPs 
against theiT editorial decision, open access represents 
an unconstitutional effort to compel speech.27 While the 
current open access cases should be resolved solely on the 
basis of preemptive federallaw,28 the distinct possibility 
that the law might change and that future legislation 
will restrict the free speech rights of ISPs in general29 
necessitates an answer to a deceptively simple question: 
are ISPs speakers under the First Amendment? 
B. The Search for First Amendment Principles 
As I have written elsewhere, there are three possible 
approaches for evaluating the free speech claims of ISPs: 
categorical, functional, and editorial. 30 The categorical 
approach would treat ISPs as speakers for all purposes 
because of their ownership and ultimate ability to control 
the information that flows through their networks. 3l In 
contrast, both the functional and editorial approaches 
would treat ISPs as speakers under some circumstances 
but not others. The functional approach would assign 
fixed First Amendment rights and duties to each distinct 
service offered by ISPs (e-mail, World Wide Web access, 
bulletin boards, chat rooms, etc.) by drawing analogies to 
corresponding real world activities or by legislative 
fiat.32 Under the editorial approach, the First 
Amendment would protect ISPs as speakers when they 
exercise editorial control over the particular service in 
question. 33 In other words, with this approach, an ISP 
would be considered a speaker only when it actively con-
trols the content available tillough its network.34 
How we determine whether ISPs should be entitled to 
First Amendment protection will depend upon which of 
the three approaches we adopt. Consider the following 
hypothetical: 
Following a public outcry over the privacy of e-
mail communications after the unveiling of the 
government's carnivore program, 35 Congress 
passes the Electronic Mail Privacy Act. The 
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Act would make it a crime for anyone to moni-
tor, intercept, edit, disclose, or otherwise tamp-
er with electronic mail or messages except pur-
suant to a court order. The Act does not 
exempt ISPs. 
Under the categorical approach, the Act would be subject 
to strict scrutiny. By tying First Amendment protection 
to ownership of the communication medium, any inter-
ference with the ISP's control over its network would rep-
resent an interference with its First Amendment rights. 
In contrast, the Act would most likely be upheld under 
rational basis review by the functional approach because 
e-mail would be considered the functional equivalent of 
snail mail, and mail carriers have traditionally not been 
afforded First Amendment protection with respect to 
their carrying of messages.36 Lastly, the editorial 
approach would require a case~by-case analysis. Strict 
scrutiny would only apply if the particular ISP objecting 
to the Act actually exercises editorial control over e-mail 
content. 
IT. Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act 
Passed as part of Congress' first attempt to restrict 
content on the Internet, the CDA addresses the liability 
of ISPs with respect to obscene, indecent, and otherwise 
offensive material. Section 230 provides in part that: "No 
provider ... of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider."37 
The CDA defines an "interactive computer service" as 
"any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including specifical-
ly a service or system that provides access to the Internet 
.... "38 "Information content providers" are defined as 
"any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information pro-
vided through the Internet or any other interactive com~ 
puter service."39 The CDA further provides that no ISP 
shall be held liable on account of "any action voluntarily 
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable .... "40 
By its terms, section 230 concludes that ISPs should 
not be treated as speakers with respect to any informa-
tion provided by others and cannot be held liable for 
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actions taken to restrict access to that content. But while 
on its face the CDA appears to provide a definitive 
answer to when ISPs should not be treated as speakers, 
the statute is both inconsistent with existing law and 
internally inconsistent with respect to what acts repre-
sent speech. On one hand, it states in clear and unequiv-
ocal terms that ISPs should not be considered speakers 
lication available through one of its online databases. 48 
Here, it concluded that CompuServe could only be held 
responsible as a distributor of the alleged defamation if it 
knew or should have known about the defamatory con-
tent. 49 But the critical divergence from the Prodigy case 
was factual, not philosophical. Unlike Prodigy where 
people and software filtered the bulletin boards, 
for content that they did not originate. In so doing, CompuServe only decided whether the publication would 
Congress rejects the role that editorial control plays in 
determining whether one has spoken and therefore 
should be held responsible for one's speech. On the other 
hand, the CDA then encourages those very same ISPs to 
exercise editorial control to censor even constitutionally 
protected speech to make the content on the Internet 
more "palatable."41 The emperor's new clothes are fine 
indeed. 
Left intact by the Supreme Court's decision in Reno, 
section 230 has become critical in Internet defamation 
cases. Notably, two early decisions examining the liabil-
ity of ISPs for defamation equated an ISP's level of edito-
rial control to that exercised by newspaper publishers 
and bookstores.42 In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services Co., a state court concluded that Prodigy's deci-
sion to exercise editorial control over its computer bul-
letin boards made it appropriate to treat Prodigy as a 
publisher of the alleged defamation. 43 From its incep-
tion, Prodigy attempted to distinguish itself from other 
ISPs by describing itself as the family-oriented net-
work. 44 The ISP claimed that it maintained such an 
environment by controlling the content of messages 
placed on its bulletin boards.45 By screening messages 
before and after their posting, Prodigy made it clear that 
open discussion on its network did not mean "anything 
goes." As the ISP, Prodigy acted as the final arbiter of 
what could and could not be said on its network. 46 
According to the court, by consciously choosing "the ben-
efits of editorial control," the ISP, like a newspaper, 
became a speaker and publisher of the alleged defama-
tion. Therefore, Prodigy opened itself up to potentially 
greater liability for defamation than networks that 
choose not to exercise editorial control.47 In other words, 
with the privilege of determining what expression would 
be made available on its network came the responsibility 
of bearing the adverse consequences resulting from that 
expressiOn. 
In a similar case, the court in Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe Inc. examined an ISP's liability for alleged-
ly defamatory statements contained in an electronic pub-
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be included in its electronic library without exercising 
any control over the publication's content. 50 As such, the 
court concluded, "CompuServe has no more editorial con-
trol over such a publication than does a public library, 
book store, or newsstand .... "51 The differences in the 
degree and nature of editorial control exercised by 
Prodigy and CompuServe, therefore, resulted in different 
applications of the same general liability rules. 
Prodigy and CompuServe were consistent with tradi-
tional defamation law. In general, defamation law sub-
jects publishers of defamatory statements to the same 
liability as the original speaker.52 In contrast, distribu-
tors such as bookstores and libraries are liable only if 
they knew or had reason to know of the defamation. 53 
The different liability rules for distributors and publish-
ers reflect the different kinds of editorial control exer-
cised by the two groups, and therefore, the differing 
degrees of culpability involved. 54 
For example, when an individual repeats what some-
one else has said or written, she clearly communicates 
ideas. More importantly, by speaking, she exercises her 
judgment as to the content of that communication. If her 
statements include defamatory falsehoods, then her 
judgment did not rise to the legally required standard of 
care, and she can be considered at fault for what was 
said. 55 It is assumed that publishers of print media exer-
cise similar judgment when they determine not only 
what news is fit to print, but also what words will be used 
to convey the news. 56 Accordingly, we require publishers 
to exercise the same degree of care as our street corner 
speaker. 
In contrast, it is not always reasonable to hold distrib-
utors of speech responsible for what they distribute. 57 
Bookstores and libraries are not familiar with all of the 
content they distribute. As recognized by the Supreme 
Court, the First Amendment thus prevents the imposi-
tion of no-fault liability for distributors because: "Every 
bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make 
himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop. 
It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near 
an approach to omniscience."58 Moreover, strict liability 
for distributors would "become the public's burden, for by 
restricting [the bookseller] the public's access to reading 
matter would be restricted. If the contents of bookshops 
and periodical stands were restricted to material of 
which their proprietors had made an inspection, they 
inten1.et 
vidual posted a message on an AOL bulletin board 
describing the sale of tasteless shirts relating to the 
Oklahoma City bombing, listing Zeran's telephone num-
ber as the number to call to purchase the shirts. 
Following the posting, Zeran received numerous angry 
calls and even death threats.68 He complained to AOL, 
might be depleted indeed."59 Unless the newsstand which removed the original message but failed to prevent 
operator knows or has reason to know of the defamation, 
therefore, we do not consider her responsible for the 
speech she distributes. 
Despite the different liability rules for distributors and 
publishers, both are protected speakers under the First 
Amendment. 60 Publishers are considered speakers 
because they select what statements and materials will 
go into their publication;61 distributors because they 
select which publications to distribute.62 The protected 
status of both publishers and distributors remains the 
same regardless of whether the form of communication is 
tangible or electronic. Thus, the Supreme Court has pro-
tected the free speech rights of broadcasters to determine 
what to broadcast on their 
networks, 63 and cable 
operators to determine 
what programming to 
carry over their cable 
systems.64 In contrast, 
common carriers such as 
telephone companies, 
which do not exercise 
any editorial control 
over the content that trav-
els over their networks, do not have First Amendment 
rights and are immune from defamation liability. 65 
Consequently, prior to the CDA, an ISP's free speech 
rights and responsibilities, like those of other media, 
would depend upon the type of editorial control it exer-
cised. 
However, by concluding that no ISP "shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider," section 230 of 
the CDA appears to reject the common law scheme of lia-
bility with respect to ISPs.66 Thus, in Zeran v. America 
Online. Inc.. the Fourth Circuit agreed with America 
Online that through section 230, "lawsuits seeking to 
hold a service provider liable for its exercise of publish-
er's traditional editorial functions-such as deciding 
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter con-
tent-are barred."67 In that case, an unidentified indi-
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the anonymous poster from posting several similar mes-
sages.69 Zeran argued that AOL should be considered a 
distributor of allegedly defamatory material posted on its 
bulletin boards, and that the CDA left distributor liabili-
ty intact.70 In rejecting this argument, the court con-
cluded that distributor liability "is merely a subset, or 
subspecies, of publisher liability .... "71 
While the Zeran court is clearly right that in the parl-
ance of defamation distributors "publish" statements, it 
is unclear whether Congress intended to employ the 
broad definition of "publisher" used in defamation law 
when it crafted §230.72 Nonetheless, the court's conclu-
sion appears consistent with the CDA. Regardless of 
whether distributors are 
publishers in the lexi-
con of defamation or in 
the ordinary meaning 
of the word, both dis-
tributors and publish-
ers are speakers, and 
the CDA specifically 
states that ISPs should 
not be treated as speak-
ers.73 
In Blumenthal v. Drudge, a federal district court 
agreed with the Zeran decision when it concluded that 
the CDA barred another action against AOL for alleged-
ly defamatory statements contained in a gossip column 
entitled the "Drudge Report."74 While Zeran involved 
messages posted by an anonymous third party, AOL's 
relationship with Drudge was much more involved. At 
the time, Drudge had entered into a licensing agreement 
with AOL to make his report available to all AOL mem-
bers. 75 Pursuant to the agreement, AOL paid Drudge 
$3,000 per month, promoted his report to current and 
potential subscribers, and retained the right to exercise 
editorial control over the content of the Drudge Report. 76 
Despite AOL's relationship with Drudge and the fact that 
it was much more than a 'passive conduit like the tele-
phone company,' the court concluded that liability was 
R,~\YMOND 8. R. Ki; 
precluded by the CD A. 77 
In granting AOL immunity from liability, the court 
appeared to distinguish between actual and potential 
editorial control. Critical to the court's decision was the 
fact that even though AOL had the contractual right to 
control the content of the Drudge Report, there was no 
evidence that it actually had any role in writing or edit-
ing the report. 78 In fact, the plaintiffs ultimately repre-
sented that Drudge was the only person who investigat-
ed, wrote, edited, and otherwise supervised the content of 
the report.79 This distinction is critical because presum-
ably if AOL had actually edited the contents of Drudge's 
report, it would have been 
considered an information 
content provider as an 
entity "responsible, m 
whole or.· in part, for the 
creation or development of 
information provided 
through the Internet," and 
thus its immunity would 
be lost. so While the Drudge 
court's conclusion that AOL was not responsible in any 
degree for the content of the Drudge Report does not 
appear to be compelled by the CDA (which does not dis-
tinguish between actual versus potential editorial control 
over a publication's contents), it highlights an important 
distinction made by Congress. Under the CDA, an indi-
vidual or entity is treated as a speaker only when it cre-
ates or develops the content in question.Sl In contrast, 
content transmission, post-publication editing, or post-
publication blocking in whole or in part by an ISP does 
not make the ISP responsible for that content.S2 
Why Congress made this decision can be explained by 
the CDA's purpose and history. In general, the conclu-
sions reached in Zeran and Drudge are supported by the 
CDA's purpose and history. As the Drudge court recog-
nized, section 230 of the CDA represents Congress' effort 
to enlist the aid of ISPs in eliminating offensive material 
from the Internet. 83 Cubby and Stratton Oakmont clear-
ly stood in the way of that purpose. If an ISP could be 
held responsible for the content available through its net-
works whenever it exercised editorial control over that 
network by removing or blocking access to certain con-
tent, Congress believed that ISPs would choose not to 
eliminate offensive material for fear of being subject to 
liabilities traditionally associated with editorial control. 
Furthermore, if ISPs faced tort liability for information 
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distributed by others, the growth of the Internet might be 
threatened. 84 Accordingly, the legislative history of sec-
tion 230 specifically states: 
One of the specific purposes of this section is to 
overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any 
other similar decisions which have treated 
such providers and users as publishers or 
speakers of content that is not their own 
because they have restricted access to objec-
tionable materia1.85 
To that end, Congress concluded that ISPs should not 
be treated as speakers with respect to content that they 
did not create. Speakers 
under the CDA, therefore, 
are limited to the original 
creators of content; subse-
quent decisions to trans-
mit, edit, or block content 
are not treated as compo-
nents of speech. To use a 
non-Internet example, 
under this approach, the 
producers and creators of the television show "Survivor" 
would be considered the speakers while CBS and its affil-
iates would not-even though they decided to broadcast 
the program and censor portions of the program during 
the broadcast. Additionally, under the Drudge court's 
interpretation of the CDA, "Survivor" would not be con-
sidered CBS's speech even if the network had the right to 
control the production of the series but chose not to do 
so.S6 
Even though the framework established by the CDA 
may make sense in instrumental terms-Congress clear-
ly wanted to eliminate indecent material on the Internet, 
and if it could not do so directly, it would enlist the aid of 
ISPs87_it is difficult to discern any principled distinc-
tions between ISPs and other speakers under these cir-
cumstances. Assuming that it is inappropriate to hold 
ISPs to the standard of liability for publishers unless 
they are directly involved in creating the content, why is 
distributor liability not appropriate? 
Consider two variations on the facts of Zeran. One, 
after receiving notice that the posting was potentially 
defamatory and injurious to Zeran, AOL decides not to 
remove the initial posting or block the subsequent post-
ings because it thinks the messages are funny and should 
be accessible to the public. Or two, after receiving notice, 
instead of blocking the posting outright, AOL deletes the 
portions ofthe messages it considers to be offensive, leav-
ing the rest intact, including Zeran's· telephone number, 
because it determines that the unedited material should 
be seen by the public. Under the Zeran and Drudge deci-
sions, the CDA would immunize AOL in both hypotheti-
cals because AOL did not create the messages, irrespec-
tive of the fact that it now has actual knowledge that the 
messages are causing harm to Zeran. If a magazine pub-
lisher can be held responsible for knowingly publishing 
harmful classified advertisements, 88 why should ISPs be 
held to a different standard of accountability? 
Zeran suggests a possible answer. According to the 
court, this immunity is necessary in order to preserve 
freedom of speech on the Internet. The court stated that 
unlike traditional print publishers, ISPs will face "an 
impossible burden" even if required to investigate claims 
of defamation given "the sheer number ofpostings" avail-
able through their network.89 This in turn would create 
a "natural incentive simply to remove messages upon 
notification, whether the contents were defamatory or 
not."90 Additionally, the court noted that distributor lia-
bility would naturally deter ISPs from censoring materi-
al because those efforts would lead to notice of potential-
ly defamatory material. 91 If true, the first explanation 
would certainly be a cause for concern and sufficient jus-
tification for immunity. However, as part III later 
demonstrates, given the fact that Congress imposed dis-
tributor-type liability upon ISPs in the context of copy-
right infringement, the Zeran court's "censor first and 
ask questions later" argument is simply a post-hoc justi-
fication that rings hollow. 
Furthermore, not only is the court's argument that 
ISPs would be deterred from censoring speech on the 
Internet unsupportable by the First Amendment, it is 
also antithetical to the promotion of a vibrant and 
responsible free market place of ideas. While Congress 
may have paid lip service to the values of free expression 
in the CDA, the statute itself threatens rather than pro-
motes freedom of speech. The CDA does not simply rec-
ognize the private editorial rights of ISPs, it encourages 
private censorship of speech by immunizing ISPs from all 
liability with respect to their editorial decisions, creating 
an environment for unrestrained and irresponsible cen-
sorship.92 
~· The Online Copyright Infringement 
Liability Limitation Act 
Congress' next effort to regulate ISPs responded to the 
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problems that the Internet presents for copyright law. 
The Internet not only brings with it the potential to facil-
itate copyright infringement, but it also raises funda-
mental conceptual difficulties for copyright law. What 
constitutes a copy? Is data stored in an ISP's server 
"fixed" for the purposes of copyright law? What duties 
and liabilities should ISPs be subject to as speech inter-
mediaries when allegedly infringing information is trans-
mitted over their networks? 
The Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act (OCILLA) was CongTess' answer to these 
questions. 93 Following the White House proposal that all 
electronic storage of information should be treated as a 
fixed copy under copyright law,94 OCILLA immunizes 
ISPs from copyright liability when the allegedly infring-
ing content is: 1) transmitted through digital communi-
cations;95 2) cached on the ISP's system;96 3) residing on 
the network at the direction of users;97 or 4) made acces-
sible through information location tools. 98 As with the 
CDA, Congress predicates immunity upon a finding that 
the ISP did not originate the content. 99 Further, as in 
the CDA, if the ISP is directly responsible for the infring-
ing content, it cannot escape liability under OCILLA. 
At this point, however, the similarities between the 
acts end. After distinguishing between the original con-
tent provider and those that merely act as conduits for 
that content, OCILLA imposes four additional require-
ments upon ISPs before they qualify for immunity under 
the statute. First, the ISP cannot exercise any editorial 
control over the material. Even if it originates from 
someone other than the ISP, if the ISP exercises any dis-
cretion in selecting the material100 or the recipients,101 
or if the ISP modifies the content of the materials, 102 it 
will not be immune from copyright liability. Second, the 
ISP cannot have actual knowledge that "the material or 
an activity using the material on the system or network 
is infringing''103 or knowledge "of any facts or circum-
stances from which infringing activity is apparent."104 
Third, if an ISP obtains knowledge or awareness of 
allegedly infringing material either on its own or after 
receiving notice from a third party, the ISP must act 
"expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the mate-
rial."105 Lastly, the ISP cannot receive any financial ben-
efit directly from the allegedly infringing material or 
activity.106 
Unlike the CDA, OCILLA recognizes that an ISP's 
post-creation exercise of editorial control over content on 
its network renders the ISP responsible for that content. 
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Whether the ISP is altering the content of the message, 
selecting which materials to make accessible in a data-
base, or independently directing materials to particular 
recipients, the ISP is exercising control over its network 
similar to the editorial control exercised by newspaper 
publishers, broadcasters, and cable operators. Liability 
under these circumstances is akin to publisher liability 
under defamation law. 
OCILLA, however, does not stop there. In addition to 
publisher liability, the Act recognizes liability for ISPs 
similar to distributor liability. Even when an ISP does 
not exercise editorial control over content residing on or 
transmitted through its network, OCILLA recognizes 
potential liability for an ISP's subsequent failure to exer-
cise that control. By conditioning immunity upon an 
ISP's lack of actual knowledge or awareness of copyright 
strong under OCILLA as it would be under the CDA. 
Nonetheless, Congress chose to impose distributor liabil-
ity upon ISPs under OCILLA, and, whatever the legisla-
tive intent, courts have chosen not to find the same in the 
CD A. 
rv. Irreconcilable Differences? 
At face value, the approaches taken by Congress in 
section 230 of the CDA and OCILLA clearly conflict with 
one another. The CDA immunizes ISPs from liability 
under all circumstances except when the ISP itself is the 
original source of the content. This approach treats ISPs 
as common carriers, like telephone companies or postal 
carriers, which do not exercise editorial control over the 
messages they carry, and correspondingly do not have 
recognized speech rights or responsibilities.llO The CDA 
violations and requiring that 
an ISP act expeditiously to 
remove or disable access to 
the allegedly infringing 
material once it has such 
knowledge or awareness, 
subsections 512(c) and (d) 
mirror distributor liability 
under defamation law. 
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the CDA, the statute itself threatens 
rather than yromotes freedmir ofsyeech: 
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does so despite the fact that 
ISPs can and do exercise edi-
torial control over their net-
works similar to publishers of 
print publications. In con-
trast, OCILLA not only 
leaves ISPs open to liability 
when they are the source of 
the infringing content, but 
also subjects them to liability 
when they simply exercise 
editorial control-or, under 
certain circumstances, fail to 
yrtvate editorial rifjhts of ISPs, it 
encourages yrivate censorship of ~eech by 
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The liability scheme 
under OCILLA, therefore, is 
directly at odds with the one 
established by the CDA. By 
imposing both publisher and 
distributor liability upon 
ISPs, OCILLA undermines 
tng .an environ.rnent for unrestrair!ed. and.) 
t.rresyons.tb1e•••·censorshty. 
exercise such control. This 
divergent treatment of ISP 
the Zeran court's explanation for why distributor liabili-
ty for ISPs should not be recognized under the CDA.l07 
Clearly, ISPs would be under the same burden to exam-
ine and evaluate the volume of claims for copyright 
infringement as they would defamation claims. ISPs 
would also have the same incentive to censor first and 
ask questions later. In fact, given the potential for sig-
nificant damage awards with respect to copyright 
infringement,lOS ISPs arguably have a greater incentive 
to censor in cases involving alleged copyright infringe-
ment. Moreover, OCILLA not only recognizes the poten-
tial for ISPs simply to restrict access to challenged con-
tent, but also encourages ISPs to take such action by 
immunizing them for censoring first and asking ques-
tions later.l09 The First Amendment threat of private 
and perhaps public censorship, therefore, is just as 
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liability exists despite compa-
rable degrees of culpability and burden. As a result, this 
section addresses whether there is a way to reconcile 
these divergent approaches, and suggests that despite 
the overt differences between the statutes, both statutes 
recognize the editorial control of ISPs. 
A. Explanations 
Can the apparent differences between the CDA and 
the OCILLA be reconciled? One answer is suggested by 
legal realism and public choice theory. Perhaps the copy-
right and entertainment industries simply have more 
political power than victims of defamation and plaintiffs' 
attorneys, or they have been more successful at captur-
ing the legislative process. One could argue that 
Congress is more concerned with protecting the informa-
tion industry from potential harm than protecting indi-
viduals. Simply put, the differences between the CDA 
and OCILLA are not the result of prineipled decision-
making. Although public choice theory may explain 
these differences, it does little to guide us in a search for 
unified First Amendment principles except to tell us that 
focusing on Congress may render our project in vain. 
However, unless one requires a slavish reliance upon 
actual intent (if such a thing is ever discernable), the fact 
that the differences between the CDA and OCILLA may 
not reflect reasoned and/or consistent policy choices does 
not undermine their value as examples that shed some 
light on the question of when ISPs should be considered 
speakers. 
Another possible explanation for the different treat-
ment is that copyright and defamation have different 
internet 
siders copyright infringement unrelated to speech. If the 
Act only permitted an ISP to be subject to liability when 
that ISP is the original source of the allegedly infringing 
content or has actual knowledge or awareness of facts of 
the infringement, 116 it might be plausible to interpret it 
as recognizing liability for acts unrelated to speech. 
Under those circumstances, OCILLA would permit liabil-
ity because the ISP is committing a direct act of infringe-
ment by "copying" protected materials or aiding others in 
making those copies. Nonetheless, as discussed above, 
OCILLA imposes copyright liability under additional cir-
cumstances_l17 For example, an ISP loses immunity 
under the OCILLA simply by selecting what material 
will be transmitted over its network, selecting the recip-
ients of that material, or by modifying the contents of the 
relationships to speech. While defamation is absolutely contents of the material.118 Moreover, knowledge or 
tied to speech because by definition it involves the com-
munication of a defamatory statement, copyright 
infringement includes acts unrelated to expression. For 
example, the individual who photocopies a new Stephen 
King novel from cover to cover without permission from 
the copyright holder is clearly making an unauthorized 
copy. But is she speabng? While many may consider the 
act of photocopying copyTight infringement, few would 
consider it speech, as it often lacks any expressive com-
ponent. 
There are, however, two major objections to this expla-
nation. First, copyright law clearly implicates speech 
and First Amendment concerns.lll Copyright infringe-
ment includes not only the act of copying itself, but also 
the act of communicating copyrighted materiaJ.l12 By 
limiting the circumstances in which individuals and enti-
ties may express themselves, copyright law clearly impli-
cates speech. In other words, when I give you an MP3 of 
a Metallica song, it may seem as though I am not com-
municating anything more than that I think you might 
enjoy the song. However, when I give you an unautho-
rized copy of Tracy Chapman's "Talking About a 
Revolution" to awaken your political consciousness or I 
copy text from your webpage and post that text on mine 
for others to see, expression is undeniable. Under the 
current copyright regime, unless the particular use of the 
copyrighted material is privileged by statute,113 falls 
under the statutory exceptions for fair use,114 or is oth-
erwise protected by the First Amendment, 115 expression 
can violate copyright law. 
Second, the requirements established by OCILLA 
themselves undermine any argument that OCILLA con-
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awareness that the material may be infringing is not 
required under those circumstances. Congress simply 
concluded that by exercising editorial control over the 
material on their networks, ISPs, like print publishers, 
should have knowledge of the allegedly infringing mate-
rial. OCILLA, therefore, recognizes liability specifically 
under circumstances when the alleged copyright 
infringement results from what may be considered an 
ISP's speech. 
B. Reconciling the Irreconcilable 
Despite the overt conflict between the CDA and OCIL-
LA with respect to liability, congressional treatment of 
ISPs under these statutes may still yield a coherent 
approach for determining when ISPs are speakers. 
Because the statutes only address ISP liability for 
speech, it is quite possible to assume that Congress rec-
ognized a uniform approach for determining when ISPs 
speak, and simply chose to immunize ISPs for some types 
of speech but not for others. As such, the CDA's state-
ment that ISPs should not be treated as publishers or 
speakers does not necessarily represent Congress' con-
clusion that they are not publishers or speakers even 
with respect to content originated by others. It may only 
represent a congressional conclusion that ISPs should 
not be held responsible for objectionable material as a 
matter of public policy even when that material should 
be considered their speech. Whether Congress could 
limit an ISP's ability to speak by modifying content orig-
inated by others, selecting the materials to make accessi-
ble to users, or selecting which users will receive the 
material, therefore, would present an entirely different 
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question. In other words, the CDA and OCILLA do not 
necessarily directly address whether ISPs are speakers 
or whether they have a right to exercise editorial control 
over their networks. 
Moreover, despite the different approaches towards 
ISP responsibility for speech, both statutes recognize 
that ISPs have the capacity to exercise editorial control 
over content on their networks. In fact, an ISP's editori-
al control over its network plays a prominent role in both 
the CDA and OCILLA. As discussed earlier, the CDA 
insulates ISPs from liability for any action taken "to 
sional treatment of ISPs in an effort to determine when 
they should be considered speakers for First Amendment 
purposes. The prominence of editorial control in the pro-
visions and history of the CDA and OCILLA suggest that 
congressional treatment of ISPs as speakers is consistent 
with the editorial approach. Neither statute takes the 
categorical approach, imposing liability based upon own-
ership of the communications medium alone. Similarly, 
both statutes recognize an ISP's editorial control with 
respect to its network as a whole rather than limiting 
that control to discrete and particular services under the 
restrict access to or availability of material" that may be functional approach. These are, however, only two 
considered objectionable_l19 Congress provided this statutes, and legislation introduced in Congress specifi-
immunity to harness an ISP's independent editorial con-
trol for its own ends-namely, the elimination of obscene 
and indecent material on the Internet.120 Similarly, 
OCILLA recognized an ISP's editorial control over con-
tent when it limited immunity to circumstances in which 
the ISP does not exercise that editorial control. 121 Thus, 
while the statutes differ with respect to the consequences 
of exercising editorial control, their recognition of an 
ISP's editorial control is undeniable. 
CONCLUSION 
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